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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between South Africa and NEPAD and its 
prospects for African economic renaissance. It contends that through the spearhead of 
NEPAD, South Africa is positioned to play the role of a pivotal state in African 
economic development. The growing South African Investments in the rest of the 
continent, which is being facilitated by NEPAD, represents a good opportunity for an 
African economic renaissance. This is especially so given the fact that the continent’s 
rising profile as a high risk, corruption infested and politically unstable environment has 
negatively impacted on its attractiveness to most foreign investors. The emphasis of the 
NEPAD document on the need for African countries to enshrine good governance and 
adhere to free market principles is expected to provide some form of protection for the 
rising South African Investments in the African region. This will in turn help strengthen 
the South African economy thus making it more relevant in the global world. For the 
South African agenda to be sustainable and lead to the economic renaissance of the 
African Continent, however, there is need to lay down the ground rules of operations 
and conduct, especially in the area of corporate governance, for the South African 
businesses operating in the continent.  
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Introduction  
 
 
In its 2001 Summit, in Lusaka Zambia, the Organisation of African Unity (now Africa 
Union), an umbrella body for independent African States endorsed and adopted the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This represents the latest attempt by 
African countries to promote economic and social development in this economically 
backward continent.1 Paradoxically, the same African continent is the custodian of a 
sizable portion of the World’s natural resources.2 Essentially, the long-term objective of 
NEPAD is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both 
individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and 
thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation arena.3  
 
To achieve the above objectives, the NEPAD document adopts a neo liberal economic 
approach that emphasises the supremacy of market forces and the promotion of free 
competition within the continent.4 In other to support and encourage the above 
objectives, the NEPAD agenda stresses the promotion of good governance. At another 
level, the programme calls for international support to help create the conducive 
environment necessary for the reintegration of Africa into the global economy. In other 
words, the main objective of the NEPAD initiative is to create a favourable environment 
for the advancement of private capital within the African continent and to make the 
international business arena more accessible to African goods and enterprises.  This 
                                               
1 According to the NEPAD Document: “In Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, live on less 
than US $1 per day. The mortality rate for children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1000, and life 
expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58 percent of the population have access to safe water. The rate 
of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 percent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in 
Africa, compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high income countries” (NEPAD, 2001, 
Paragraph 4).  
 
2 Lagos Plan of Action (1980, p.5). See also Hamid (1982, p. 150).  
 
3 Since the 1960s, Africa is the only region to have experienced a decline in real dollar exports per capita. 
The continent’s share of world trade fell from more than 3 percent in the 1950s to less than 2 percent in 
the mid-1990s and to only 1.2 percent if South Africa is excluded (World Bank, 2000, p.20).   
  
4 Under the neo liberal economic concept, the ideal future is one in which the individual is as free as 
possible to pursue his own selfish interests. Little emphasis is placed on the concept of altruism 
(Mathews, 2004, p.501).  
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paper contends that NEPAD is in the main, the product of South African private sector 
driven entrepreneurial expansionist ambition in Africa. The main essence of NEPAD is 
to facilitate the advancement of South African capital to other African countries. This 
will in turn help strengthen the South African economy thus making it more relevant in 
the global world.5 Despite this, the paper argues that South Africa, through the 
spearhead of NEPAD is positioned to play the role of a pivotal state in engendering 
African economic development.6 The South African expansionist agenda therefore 
represents the best chance for an African economic renaissance. This is especially so 
given the fact that South Africa businesses have permeated most economic sectors in 
the African continent. Perhaps the most important South African investments in the 
continent are those in basic infrastructure like telecommunications, railways and power. 
These have great potentials for accelerating economic development.7 Remarkably, 
South African businesses are thriving in a terrain where western economic interests are 
fleeing due to the rising profile of the continent as a high risk, corruption infested and 
politically unstable zone. Various incentives by African Governments have not been 
able to resuscitate the interest of the west in the region.   
 
For the South African investments to be sustainable and lead to the economic 
renaissance of the African Continent, however, there is need to put in place explicit 
corporate governance rules for such investments. In addition to this, South Africa 
should do more to justify its status as a pivotal state by providing more developmental 
assistance to less privileged African states. To achieve its aim, this paper is divided into 
four parts. Part One outlines the origins of the NEPAD programme and critiques some 
of its main provisions while Part Two analyses the operating mechanisms of NEPAD. 
                                               
5 “[B]y world standards, the South African economy is very small and is not very competitive. It… is not 
very attractive to investors and depends on access to other markets for its growth. Therefore, South Africa 
needs a growing Africa in which it can have better access to markets because of proximity. In short, 
South Africa’s support for NEPAD is driven primarily by the above factors and not by ideological 
considerations that are not rooted in reality” (Nkuhlu, 2003, p.4).  
 
6 “A pivotal state is so important regionally that its collapse would spell trans-boundary mayhem… A 
pivotal State’s economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster its region’s economic 
vitality and political soundness” (quoted in Schoeman, 2003, p.352). See also Chase et al (1996, p.37) and 
Cochran, 2001).     
 
7 “By far the most important investment trend in Africa in the post apartheid era has been the numerous 
investments being made in infrastructural development. One of the setbacks of African countries securing 
investments has been the absence of adequate supporting infrastructure such as telecommunications, 
transport, power supply and road and air links. South African companies have been quick to notice this 
inadequacy and have realised the potential for profit in infrastructural development” (Naidu, 2003, p.11).  
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Part Three examines the potential role of South Africa in African economic renaissance 
while Part Four concludes the paper.  
 
The NEPAD Programme  
  
Although most African countries gained political independence in the 1960s, the search 
for a viable development formula for most of these countries has continued without end. 
Severe criticism of colonial economic policies as exploitative was one of the main 
reasons that led to the demise of colonialism in the continent. The emergent African 
states soon accused western corporations as being agents of neo colonialism. This later 
led to the mass nationalisation exercises of the 1960s/ 1970s. It is instructive that Africa, 
more than any region in the world, recorded the highest number of nationalisations 
during the period.8 Despite this, African economic conditions did not improve. If 
anything, the economic conditions worsened in several of these African countries. 
Corruption, inefficiency and nepotism reigned supreme in these nationalised 
corporations. The negative impact of the oil crisis of the 1970s on the economies of 
most African countries coupled with the deterioration in the continent’s terms of trade 
did not also help matters.9 It was under these circumstances that several African 
countries abandoned their nationalist interventionist economic policies and signed on to 
the market oriented economic policy approach (Structural Adjustment Programme) 
championed by the Breton Wood twins. The main pillars of the above programme were: 
fiscal austerity, privatisation and market liberalisation.10  
 
At the regional level, African economic development initiatives have also not fared 
better. Although the Organisation of African Unity was formed in 1963, it was not 
until 1980 that it came up with a specific economic blueprint for the continent: the 
Final Act of Lagos and the Lagos Plan of Action.11 Under the Lagos Plan of Action, 
                                               
 
8 Rood, 1976, p.431. 
 
9 See, World Bank (2000, Chapter 1) and Cashin and Pattillo (2000) for detailed discussion of these 
points.   
 
10 Nkuhlu, 2004, pp.3-4.    
 
11 Under the Final Act of Lagos, the Heads of State reaffirmed their commitment to establish an African 
Economic Community by the Year 2000. This was in order to ensure the economic, social and cultural 
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for instance, African leaders resolved to adopt a regional approach towards the 
development of the African continent, “based primarily on collective self-reliance.”12 
The Plan blamed most of the African problems on colonisation and slave trade and 
specifically acknowledged the “political constraints on the development of our 
continent caused by colonial and racist domination and exploitation” but hoped that: 
“Africa, which had survived the brutalities of imperialism, racism and apartheid, has 
the resilience to pull itself out of the economic malaise.”13 The main targets of the 
plan were, among others: reducing illiteracy and promoting science and technology, 
transport and communications, self-sufficiency in food production, and industrial 
development.14  
 
The lack of commitment of member states to the OAU, which was perhaps caused by 
lack of belief in its potency, was perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that shortly after 
the release of the Lagos Plan of Action, several Finance Ministers of OAU member 
states asked the World Bank for an opinion on the Economic crisis in the continent. The 
World Bank subsequently published its Report titled: “Accelerated Development in Sub 
Saharan Africa.”15 The World Bank Report sharply criticised the Lagos Plan of Action 
arguing that it failed to emphasise the need for public sector reform as an important 
ingredient of economic development. The World Bank was also concerned that the plan 
did not put much emphasis on the importance of private sector participation in the 
promotion of economic development. It therefore recommended that African states 
should decrease their role in the economy and social welfare programmes through 
mechanisms such as privatisation, liberalisation and the promotion of market forces as 
determinants of economic activity. Furthermore, the World Bank criticised the proposal 
by the Lagos Plan of Action for economic self-reliance, regional integration and partial 
de linking from international capitalism. It instead, re-emphasized the need for the 
                                                                                                                                         
integration of Africa. The objective of such community included, among others: the promotion of 
collective, accelerated, self reliant and self sustaining development of member states; cooperation among 
these states and their integration in the economic social and cultural fields (section 2a).    
 
12 Paragraph 1. 
 
13 Paragraph 11.   
 
14 Bujra (1982, p.i); and Achenhou (1983, p. 6). 
 
15  See Bujra (1982, p.i) and Achenhou (1983, p. 6). 
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increased integration of African economies into the international economy.16  Given the 
divergent views expressed in the two reports, one had to give way. The weakness of the 
African States, their lack of political will and the power of the Breton Wood Institutions 
ensured that the World Bank view triumphed.17  
 
Most African countries have since signed up for International Monetary Fund 
imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes based on principles similar to those 
propounded by the World Bank. This has however not always helped matters. Most 
of the African economies remain distressed and the quality of life continues to drop. 
Scholars opposed to the neo liberal economic system always point to this fact as 
evidence that such an economic system is unable to aid the development of African 
countries.18 On their part, the Breton Wood institutions insist that the continuing 
deterioration of most African economies is linked to poor governance.19  
 
In 1994, the Apartheid policy in South Africa was formally abolished. South Africa was 
subsequently admitted into the OAU, fundamentally altering the economic structure of 
Africa. By this singular development, South Africa has become the economic 
powerhouse of the continent. This country, which is by far the most developed country 
in the continent, accounts for more than 20 percent of the continent’s GDP and uses 50 
percent of its modern energy.20 Its GNP is more than three times that of the other eleven 
members of the Southern African Development Community put together and is three 
times larger than that of Nigeria.21 The South African economic success, despite 
apartheid, was achieved under neo-liberal market conditions. The fact that apartheid 
ended shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, by extension, control 
economies, further entrenched belief in neo liberalism.22 It was perhaps because of the 
                                               
 
16 For an analyses of these comparisons, see: Makgetlaneng (2003), Achenhou (1983), Amin (1982), 
Nkandawire (1982) and Bujra (1982).    
 
17 See Organisation of African Unity, 1998, p.2.  
 
18 See, for instance, Olukoshi (2002b). For general criticisms of the utility value of neo liberal economic 
policies for African development see: Mathews (2004) and Third World Network/ CODESRIA (2002).    
 
19 See Makgetlaneng, 2003, pp.6-7. 
 
20 Nkuhlu, 2003, p.4. 
 
21 Cornwell, 2002, p.24.  
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above, coupled with the negative end result of the nationalisation policies in some 
African countries that made the ANC Government reluctant to tamper with the 
country’s thriving entrepreneurial class and the neo liberal economic environment that 
ensured their success. Rather it has, especially under its current President, Mbeki, 
supported this group. It is this relationship between business and government in South 
Africa that was the main reason that propelled the emergence of NEPAD. This fact also 
impacted on the provisions of the NEPAD Document.  
 
It is on the above premise that the NEPAD document preaches free competition within 
and among African States, while calling for international efforts to make world markets 
more accessible to African countries. On the issue of improving intra African trade, 
which currently accounts for less than 10 percent of the regional trade, the NEPAD 
document recommends that this should be rigorously pursued with the aim of sourcing 
within Africa imports formerly sourced from other parts of the world.23 The above 
objectives are to be achieved through the following policies: the creation of marketing 
mechanisms and institutions to develop marketing strategies for African products; 
publicizing African importing and exporting companies and their products through trade 
fairs; promoting and improving regional trade agreements; harmonising tariffs and 
product standards; and, reducing export taxes.24    At the international level, the NEPAD 
document emphasises the need to negotiate measures and agreements that will help 
facilitate access to the world market by African products. The document also 
emphasized the need to remove non-tariff barriers. Along these lines, it asserted that: 
 
African leaders believe that improved access to the markets of industrialised 
countries for products in which Africa has a comparative advantage is 
crucial. Although there have been significant improvements in terms of 
lowered tariffs in recent years, there remain significant exceptions on tariffs 
while non tariff barriers also constitute major impediments. Progress on this 
issue would greatly enhance the economic growth and diversification of 
African production and exports.25 
 
                                                                                                                                         
22 Daniel et al, 2003, p.373-4. 
 
23 Nkuhlu, 2004, p.14. 
 
24 Paragraph 166.    
 
25 Paragraph 170.  
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Similarly, the NEPAD document strongly advocates the promotion of the private sector 
and private capital flows in Africa. Recommended actions towards this include: 
enhancing the entrepreneurial, managerial and technical capacities of the private sector 
by supporting technology acquisition, production improvements and skills development; 
strengthening chambers of commerce, trade and professional associations and their 
regional networks; organising dialogue between the government and the private sector 
in order to develop a shared vision of economic development strategy and remove 
constraints on private sector development; and, strengthening and encouraging the 
growth of micro, small and medium scale industries.26  On private capital flows, the 
NEPAD document argues that: 
 
The first priority is to address investors’ perception of Africa as a “high 
risk” continent, especially with regard to security of property rights, 
regulatory frameworks and markets. Several key elements of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development will help to lower these risks 
gradually, and include initiatives relating to peace and security, political and 
economic governance, infrastructure and poverty reduction. Interim 
measures for risk mitigation will be put in place, including credit guarantee 
schemes and strong regulatory and legislative frameworks.27    
 
The NEPAD document also spells out a clear role for the international community in 
aiding African development. It, for instance, advocates debt relief for African countries 
participating in the NEPAD programme. In the pursuit of the above, the programme 
proposes a two pronged approach: in the interim, debt service ceilings should be fixed 
as a proportion of fiscal revenue while in the long run, debt relief should be linked with 
costed poverty reduction outcomes.28 Aside from debt relief, international aid is another 
area recognised by the NEPAD document where the international community has a role 
to play. Here the document seeks increased Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 
flows in the medium term as well as the reform of the ODA delivery system to ensure 
that flows are more effectively utilised by recipient African countries. Specifically, it 
asserts that: 
 
                                               
 
26 Paragraph 164.  
 
27 Paragraph 151. 
 
28 Paragraph 146.  
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A typical dimension of Africans taking responsibility for the continent’s 
destiny is the need to negotiate a new relationship with their development 
partners. The manner in which development assistance is delivered in itself 
creates serious problems for developing countries. The need to negotiate 
with, and account separately to, donors supporting the same sector or 
programme is both cumbersome and inefficient. Also, the tying of 
development assistance generates further inefficiencies. The appeal is for a 
new relationship that takes the country programmes as a point of departure. 
The new relationship should set out mutually agreed performance targets 
and standards for both donors and recipients. Many cases clearly show that 
the failure of projects is not caused only by the poor performance of 
recipients, but also by bad advice given by donors.29    
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the NEPAD document sees the need for 
reviewing the existing relationship between underdeveloped Africa and the developed 
world as being of critical importance in the promotion of African economic growth. It is 
on the basis of this that it proposes debt relief and a review of the ODA administration. 
Unfortunately, it fails to do the same for intra African relationships. This is so despite 
the glaring disparities in economic fortunes of various African countries. The result of 
this failure is the fact that the document contains little on how more economically 
advantaged African countries like South Africa can help assist the development of its 
less fortunate neighbours. This essentially places South Africa, a middle income 
country, with a per capita income of US$ 2780 on the same pedestal with other Sub- 
Saharan African countries, most of which are classified as low income countries with an 
average per-capita income of US$ 490, when it comes to dealing with the developed 
world. Even Nigeria, which is essentially the largest market in the region has a per 
capita income of US$ 320.30 On the other hand, despite the extensive poverty in these 
Sub-Saharan African countries, South Africa’s contribution to their development is 
mainly through the profit driven private sector. There is little contribution from the 
South African Government to the economies of its less fortunate NEPAD member states 
in terms of development aid. 
 
By adopting the above approach, the NEPAD programme has put South Africa in a 
position to be the major beneficiary of free market access and competition in inter 
continental trade without a corresponding financial commitment to the development of 
                                               
29 Paragraphs 148 and 183  
 
30 See, World Bank (2004). 
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poorer African countries.31 Such an attitude has led to increased suspicions about South 
African motives in the continent. Perhaps more important is the fact that for South 
Africa to be an effective pivotal state, it has to offer more developmental assistance to 
less fortunate NEPAD member states. This will, at the very least, help increase the 
country’s acceptability in such states and help reduce mistrust for South Africa, which 
dates back to the apartheid era. The fact that South Africa stands out economically in 
Africa is not in doubt. It is for instance widely known that a major impediment to intra 
African trade is the preponderance of primary goods across the breath of the continent. 
The paucity of manufactured goods in the continent makes it difficult for any 
meaningful volume of trade to take place between these African countries. South Africa, 
however, is one of the most advantaged African countries with respect to the export of 
manufactured goods. In 2001, for instance, the percentage of manufactured goods to the 
total exports of South Africa stood at 59.4 Percent. This is a major advantage when 
compared, for instance with the 2.3 percent recorded by Algeria and the 0.2 percent 
recorded by Nigeria.32 Classifying South Africa among economically less viable 
African countries under the NEPAD scheme has also positioned the country to become 
the major African beneficiary of better trading conditions for African goods. This is 
especially so given the fact that South Africa is Africa’s biggest economy and, despite 
its limitations, remains the most active African player in intercontinental trade.  
 
In 2003, for instance, South Africa imported 116 billion Rand worth of goods from 
Europe, representing 45 percent of its total imports for the year. On the other hand, it 
exported goods worth 92 billion Rand to that continent. Its second major trading partner 
is Asia. Thirty-five percent of South African imports in 2003 came from Asia. The 
African continent, on the other hand accounted for only 3 percent of South Africa’s 
import in that year. Despite this, the continent remains South Africa’s most profitable 
trading partner at least in terms of trade balance. In 2002 and 2003, for instance, South 
Africa had a trade surplus of 34 billion Rand and 30.7 billion Rand respectively, in its 
                                               
 
31 This is because South Africa has the most competitive economy in Africa. Most benefits of any 
international concessions to the continent, is therefore likely to accrue to the country.   
 
32 Economic Commission for Africa (2004). It is important to note that Nigeria and Algeria are also major 
promoters of the NEPAD project. 
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trade with the rest of the African continent. In contrast the country has consistently run 
huge deficits with its two major trading partner continents: Europe and Asia.33      
 
In terms of Investments, Africa has also been very profitable for South African firms. 
South Africa is now the largest foreign direct investor in the African continent. Between 
1990 and 2000, for instance, South African investment in the African continent 
averaged US$ 1.4 billion annually.34 This has been so despite the degenerating security, 
political and economic conditions in many of these African countries. While the above 
negative conditions may have made western investors wary of doing business in Africa, 
this has not been so for the South African investors. This is because a legacy of the 
apartheid past of the country is the high rate of violence in the South African society. 
African countries, despite their political and economic instability, therefore usually 
constitute manageable security and business risks for South African businesses. The 
South African business interest in Africa, despite the risks, is, also, at least in part, 
linked to the high returns recorded by their investments in the continent. It is, for 
instance, known that returns on African investments, made by South African companies, 
sometimes exceed those in South Africa by as much as 100 percent.35  
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that while South Africa remains competitive in the 
African arena, it is uncompetitive in its economic relationship with Asia and Europe. 
The NEPAD project is thus a South African strategy to increase its integration with the 
African continent thereby increasing its share of the very profitable African market and 
its global competitiveness.36 In pursuing the above agenda, South Africa has been 
                                               
 
33 See Table 1.   
 
34 Leon (2004). For detailed descriptions and analyses of South African investments in Africa see Miller 
(2003) and Daniel et al (2003, 2004). See also Table two for a summary of some recent material 
investments made by South African companies in Africa.   
 
35 See Daniel et al, 2003, p.368.  
 
36 It is important to re-emphasise that South Africa is not the only beneficiary from the NEPAD project. 
The country’s foreign direct investments have also positively impacted on recipient African countries by 
contributing to jobs, manpower development and government finance via taxation and licences. More 
important however is the South African investments in basic infrastructure like power, railways and 
telecommunications which is the foundation of economic development and growth.    
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careful to make the concept look like an OAU idea by broadening the NEPAD 
leadership base.37  
 
NEPAD: Operating Mechanisms 
 
Officially, the idea of NEPAD dates back to a mandate given to South Africa’s 
President Mbeki and Algeria’s President Bouteflika. by the OAU Extra Ordinary 
Summit in Sirte, Libya in September 1999. Essentially, they were requested to take up 
the issue of debt cancellation with the industrialised countries on behalf of the OAU 
member countries. The OAU, in its Lome (Togo) summit of July 2000, expanded the 
above mandate to include President Obasanjo of Nigeria. This was deemed necessary in 
order to ensure synergies especially given the fact that the Havana South South Summit 
of June 2000 had requested Obasanjo and Mbeki to carry out similar negotiations with 
the West.38 
 
The three Presidents subsequently proposed that instead of taking up debt cancellation 
as a single issue, they be mandated to prepare a comprehensive development agenda. 
This resulted in the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Plan (MAP). 
Subsequently, in January 2001, they became aware of the Omega Plan, which was 
prepared by President Wade of Senegal. Realising the need for the Continent to unite 
behind a single plan, the Omega Plan and the MAP were subsequently merged to form 
NEPAD. In the formulation process of the NEPAD agenda, the West was extensively 
consulted. In a 2001 publication, President Mbeki painstakingly detailed his efforts at 
                                               
37 Schoeman, 2003, p.359. 
38  “The mandates to represent the interests of Africa on the question of debt was given to Presidents 
Mbeki and Bouteflika at the Extraordinary Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit held in Sirte in 
Libya in September 1999. Similarly, mandates to represent the interests of the South were given to 
President Mbeki (in his capacity as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and President Obasanjo 
(in his capacity as Chair of the Group of 77 developing countries (G77)) by the South Summit held in 
Havana, Cuba, in April this year. Prime Minister Leekpai was invited in his capacity as President of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad 10) and a representative of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The delegation and the consensus they represented 
can be seen as a determined effort by the countries of the South to confront what is increasingly seen as 
the relentless forces of globalization, by engaging strategically with the G8 before their annual summit. 
The delegation urged countries of the North to seriously address issues of concern to the South, primarily 
efforts to ensure people-centred development and poverty alleviation. Within the context of globalization, 
the G8 Summit was seen as an important grouping for convincing wealthy countries of the North of the 
need to enter into partnerships for the development of the South and especially Africa” (Mehatey, 2002).  
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winning international consensus for the MAP, which is the forerunner of NEPAD. 
According to him: 
 
During the year 2000, we spent sometime meeting the political leadership of 
the developed world-the North. Accordingly, in May we met Prime Minister 
Blair and President Clinton in London and Washington D.C., respectively. 
We also met the then Governor George W. Bush in Austin, Texas. In June, 
we were part of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance. … In the 
same month, we visited to participate in and addressed the meeting of 
Nordic Prime Ministers. Again in June, we addressed the meeting of the 
European Council held in Portugal, which was attended by all heads of 
government of the EU. In July, together with Presidents Obasanjo and 
Bouteflika, we met heads of state and governments of G7 in Tokyo, and had 
the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with the Japanese Prime 
Minister, Yoshiro Mori. While in Tokyo, we also met the President of the 
World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn. Later, in Pretoria, we also held discussions 
with the Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Kohler. In September, we 
addressed the UN Millennium Summit and had an opportunity to meet 
Presidents Putin of Russia, among others. Before this, we had also 
interacted with the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who committed the 
UN to co-operate with us as we worked on the MAP.39  
 
Based on such assertions, opponents of NEPAD have argued that the idea of NEPAD 
was essentially initiated from the West with little consultation with African 
stakeholders.40 In other words, rather than represent the African viewpoint, NEPAD 
represents the viewpoint of the West, which has an agenda different from that of the 
African people.41  
 
Despite the factual accuracy of the above assertions, such criticisms make little sense, at 
least in the context of the current NEPAD development. This is because the very 
essence of NEPAD is to reintegrate Africa into the global economy. Consulting with the 
major actors in the global world is therefore essential for the successful take off and 
implementation of the programme. Critics of the NEPAD programme can only be 
satisfied by an agenda that shuns globalisation and neo liberal economic policies. This is 
however the very basis of the South African economy which was instrumental in 
conceptualising the NEPAD agenda. Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that the 
Lagos Plan of Action, which was against globalisation and neo liberal economic 
                                               
39 Quoted in Nabudere, 2002, pp.5-6.  
 
40 See, for instance, Bond (2002a, p.1-2) and Ngwane (2002, pp.3-4). 
 
41 The Issue of South African interests will be dealt with in the next section.   
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policies, failed. One of the main reasons why the programme could not even take off 
was because it failed to win the endorsement of western governments and institutions. It 
was because the programme failed that the idea of NEPAD came to light. Had the 
programme succeeded in lifting Africa out of its poverty trap, there would have been no 
need for NEPAD.  
 
Perhaps because of the extensive western consultations, the NEPAD agenda was 
markedly different from that of the Lagos Plan of Action and attracted immediate 
sympathy and praises from the West. The 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa laid the 
foundation for this support. In its Press Release after the summit, the G8 asserted that: 
we agreed to support African efforts to resolve African problems. Peace, 
stability and the eradication of poverty in Africa are among the most 
important challenges we face in the new millennium.  We welcome the New 
African Initiative, which is based on the principles of responsibility and 
ownership, with an emphasis on democracy, transparency, good 
governance, rule of law and human rights as fundamental factors of 
development. This initiative provides the basis for a new intensive 
partnership between Africa and the developed world….  We also stress the 
importance of working in partnership with African governments to improve 
access of African products to world markets, attract foreign direct 
investment and promote investment in key social sectors, in particular 
health and education….. We are committed to promoting this objective with 
our African partners and in multilateral fora - in the UN, the World Bank 
and the IMF, and in a new Round of WTO negotiations.42 
The Secretary General of the United Nations has also appointed a high level panel 
consisting of thirteen eminent persons to advise on international support for the NEPAD 
Programme. This widespread support for NEPAD is perhaps because the NEPAD 
document adopted a more conciliatory approach towards the West and was more self-
critical. For instance, although it maintains that colonisation, the cold war and the 
                                               
42 Press Release titled: Genoa Plan for Africa (July 21, 2001). Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, was 
even more positive. In a July 1 2002 speech to the House of Commons, he asserted that: “for the first time 
there is a comprehensive plan [NEPAD], dealing with all aspects of the African plight. For the first time, 
it is constructed with reforming African leaders as partners, not as passive recipients of aid. For the first 
time, we link explicitly and clearly good governance and development. So this is not our destination—of 
an African renaissance—achieved, but it is a new departure. It is a real signal of hope for the future, and it 
is up to us now to make it a reality. I am proud of the part that Britain has played in it. There are those 
who say that Africa matters little to the British people. The millions who donate to charities—who give 
up time, energy and commitment to the cause of Africa—eloquently dispute this. Africa does matter: to 
us and to humanity. We intend to see the plan through” (House of Commons Hansard Debates, Volume 
388, 1st July 2002). 
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workings of the international economic system are some of the causes of Africa’s 
underdevelopment, it rightly admits that African countries cannot excise themselves 
from blame. Specifically, the Plan recognises the “inadequacies of and shortcomings in 
the policies pursued by many countries in the post independence era” as another 
contributory factor to the African underdevelopment.43  
 
The NEPAD document then suggests that there is a new emergent leadership in the 
continent and that “African governments are much more resolute about regional and 
continental goals of economic cooperation and integration.” The document further 
asserts that: 
 
The objective of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development is to 
consolidate democracy and sound economic management on the continent. 
Through the Programme, African leaders are making a commitment to the 
African people and the world to work together in rebuilding the continent. It 
is a pledge to promote peace and stability, democracy, sound economic 
management and people centred development, and to hold each other 
accountable in terms of the agreements outlined in the Programme.44  
 
This is the main reason why NEPAD introduced an African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM). The essence of this Peer Review Mechanism, which is voluntary, is to ensure 
that member countries maintain appropriate standards of conduct. This has become one 
of the most innovative, as well as controversial aspects of NEPAD.45 In September 
2002, for instance, the United Nations General Assembly High Level Plenary Meeting 
on NEPAD described the APRM as “one of the most important and innovative 
mechanisms of NEPAD.”46 In October 2002, the Chairman of the NEPAD Steering 
Committee made explicit the link between the successful implementation of the APRM 
and the credibility of the NEPAD Programme: 
 
Steps are being taken to implement the African Peer Review process early 
next year [2003]…. There are of course many sceptics who do not believe 
the APRM will be professional and credible and therefore capable of 
rendering assessment by external agencies unnecessary. However, I believe 
                                               
43  Paragraph 14. 
 
44 Paragraph 202.  
 
45 Cilliers, 2003, p.1. 
 
46 President Mbeki’s Report to the UN General Assembly High Level Plenary Meeting on NEPAD (16th 
September 2002).   
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that we owe it to ourselves to prove them wrong. The continent needs a peer 
review process that will enhance sustainability of policy reforms and also 
reinforce good practice. Successful implementation of the APRM will 
greatly enhance the credibility of policy reforms in the continent.47  
 
Despite this explicit promise to implement APRM by early 2003, it was not until April 
2005 that Ghana became the first country to welcome an APRM Review Mission.48 
Furthermore, as at January 2005, only 23 countries had signed up to the APRM Scheme. 
Despite these developments, few believe that the APRM would be of much benefit to 
African countries. The main argument in support of this position is the fact that it is 
illogical to expect a continental enforcement of good governance from African leaders. 
This is so because most of them have poor human rights, corruption and political 
records in their various countries. The credibility of members of the NEPAD Steering 
Committee (several of them are also members of the APR Forum) for instance, has been 
called to question. Along these lines, it has been stated that: 
The 15 nations represented on its implementation committee include oil-rich 
Gabon. It has been led since 1967 by President Omar Bongo, who was 
asked to close personal bank accounts at Citibank of New York in 1999 
after moving $130-million (U.S.) through them. Also on the committee are 
Nigeria and Cameroon — perceived as the most corrupt and second most 
corrupt countries in the world, according to the independent watchdog 
Transparency International. Rwanda is another member; it is one of the 
foreign nations involved in the vicious scramble for mineral wealth 
disguised as a civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.49 
Another area of concern, related to the above is that of human rights violation. This, till 
date, remains a major problem even in many of the so-called democracies. Several 
African Governments carry out explicit acts of oppression against their citizens. Here, 
again, the leaders of the NEPAD Project are not excluded in the unfortunate acts of 
human rights abuse. In recent times, the government of Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika 
and Obasanjo have faced intense criticism for violating the human rights of their 
citizenries on a large scale.50   
                                               
 
47 Nkhulu, 2002, p.8. 
 
48 See Brief Report Issued at the end of the African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Mission to 
Ghana (2005).   
 
49 Knox (2002) 
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Another closely related issue is corruption. This has remained one of the greatest 
impediments of economic growth and development in Africa. Take the case of Nigeria 
as an example. The country has consistently remained on the top three bracket of the 
Transparency International table of the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption 
is so advanced that President Obasanjo, who is also the AU Chairman appears to be 
helpless, if not part of the problem. According to the British and American Intelligence 
Report, 60 percent of the corruption in Nigeria emanates from the Presidency.51 
Although Mbeki’s South Africa may not be as corrupt as Nigeria, it still has a 
corruption problem to grapple with.52 Even the democratic process has witnessed large-
scale abuses in some of these countries. The mass rigging of the 2003 elections by 
President Obasanjo’s ruling party is evidence of this.53 Given the fact that the leaders of 
NEPAD all have poor corruption, democratic and human rights records at home, it is 
doubtful to see how such leaders can push for good governance in Africa.54 It was 
therefore not surprising that when a test-case political situation emerged, it became clear 
that the entire concept of good governance was more political than economic.  
 
Here, the case in point has been the political situation in Zimbabwe. Incidentally, 
Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo, key proponents of NEPAD, are also deeply involved in 
the international efforts to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe. Specifically, they are part of 
the three man Commonwealth Panel set up to adjudge the controversial political 
situation in Zimbabwe. The third member of the Panel was Australia’s Prime Minister 
Howard. Despite the insistence of Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki that Zimbabwe 
should be allowed back to the fold after its one-year suspension, this did not happen. 
Rather, the minority report of Prime Minister Howard was adopted. This was perhaps 
because there was a threat that the leaders of the Western Commonwealth countries and 
the Queen of England, who is the official head of the Commonwealth would boycott the 
December 2003 Nigerian Commonwealth Summit if it did not exclude Mugabe.55 
                                                                                                                                         
50 See Bond, 2002b, p. 81. 
 
51 Daily Champion, April 17, 2003, p.32. 
52 See, for instance, Ngwane, 2002, pp.3-4. 
53 See Bond (2003a, p.11; 2003b, p. 18). 
 
54 For further evidence on the nature of African democracies, see Massamba et al (forthcoming).  
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Western Leaders have also been quick to suggest that they supported NEPAD because 
the document promised improved transparencies in African democracies and some have 
even threatened to withdraw support.56 The Zimbabwe case, it is argued, is thus the test 
case for Mbeki, who is the main proponent of the NEPAD Project to prove that he has 
sincere intentions about the NEPAD project. On his part, President Mbeki insists that it 
could not  have been the intention of either South Africa or the entire leadership of the 
continent to subject political governance issues for review under NEPAD. Such an 
action, according to him, is beyond the mandate of the Initiating Committee of the 
NEPAD. Mbeki also argued that it has never been the intention that the NEPAD peer 
review process would conduct the work of the Commission of Human Rights.57 This 
controversy with respect to the link between NEPAD and good governance was 
excellently summed up by Dr. Ian Taylor of the University of Botswana, in his recent 
Memorandum to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs of the British House of 
Commons:  
most focus on the NEPAD has been aimed at the section on Political 
Governance and Peer Review…. Unlike the now-defunct Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), it appeared to some observers that the NEPAD was a 
qualitatively different document from previous African "declarations", 
perhaps for the first time advancing a promise to self-police African leaders 
and rein in corrupt autocrats. However, it now appears highly improbable 
that there will be any sanctions or counter-measures against those countries 
that fail to pass the governance muster. Yet without such measures any 
review mechanism is largely pointless as it will have no teeth. 
Problematically, it was President Mbeki who unilaterally claimed that the 
African Review Mechanism (APRM) would not review the political 
governance of African countries. This marked a retreat from earlier 
pronouncements and came after an extended period of time when the 
NEPAD's promoters (primarily Mbeki and Obasanjo) not only consistently 
refused to criticize Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his party's behavior 
but also supported him. Whilst Mbeki has sought to deny that there should 
be any link between inaction over Zimbabwe and the NEPAD's credibility, 
virtually all observers have stressed the crucial linkage.58  
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The above disagreement remains a contentious issue and threatens to undermine the 
entire NEPAD project.59  
Another contentious issue in the NEPAD Project is its perception of globalisation. Here 
the NEPAD document essentially takes the view that there is currently no alternative to 
it. Although the document admits that most African countries have not benefited from 
the globalisation process, it, as already mentioned, argues that this is, at least in part, 
due to the failure of political and economic leadership in many African countries. It is 
this leadership failure that has impeded the effective mobilisation and utilisation of 
scarce resources in productive economic sectors and inhibited local and foreign direct 
investments.60 Based on the above, the document recommended that: 
 
What is needed is a commitment on the part of governments, the private 
sector and other institutions of civil society, to genuine integration of all 
nations into the global economy and body politic. This requires the 
recognition of global interdependence with regard to production and 
demand, and environmental base that sustains the planet, cross border 
migration, a global financial architecture that rewards good socio economic 
management, and global governance that recognises partnerships among all 
people. We hold that it is within the capacity of the international community 
to create fair and just conditions in which Africa can participate effectively 
in the global economy and body politic.61  
 
Opponents of NEPAD have however argued that globalisation is simply a tool that 
operates to the benefit of the developed economies by enriching such economies to the 
detriment of developing countries. They contend that the expectation that the 
international community will “create fair and just conditions in which Africa can 
participate effectively in the global economy and body politic” is the triumph of hope 
                                               
 
59 Along these lines, it has been suggested that: “since the Zimbabwe elections, Africa has been warned 
that if the African leaders cannot condemn their “peers,” they too will be targeted for “punishment.” This 
was demonstrated when Presidents Mbeki of South Africa and Obasanjo of Nigeria, were made to eat 
their own words by agreeing to suspension of Zimbabwe after the controversial presidential election in 
that country. NEPAD has after September 11 become a weapon of control of the African states. In the 
context of September 11, Mugabe was being targeted and singled out as a representative of ‘evil’ in 
Africa because he had dared interference with the ‘rights’ of Rhodesians over their ‘land.’ He was judged 
to have rigged the elections even before they were held and Blair had insisted that Zimbabwe be expelled 
from the Commonwealth even before the elections were held! … This shows how NEPAD is being used 
to achieve certain security objectives of the “partners” than of addressing poverty and conflict in Africa” 
(Nabudere, 2002, pp.20-21).     
 
60 Paragraph 34.  
 
61 Paragraph 41.  
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over experience.62 They therefore dismiss the entire NEPAD project as an attempt to get 
the Western powers to re-colonise Africa. Such criticisms are however unrealistic. The 
expectation that the West should act as a Santa Claus that would spoon-feed Africa to 
economic prosperity is rather idealistic. Worse still, as already mentioned, most critics 
of NEPAD downplay the fact that the Lagos Plan of Action, which was the African 
antithesis to globalisation never got off the ground. They also offer no practical 
alternative to neo liberal economic policies. All they do is to blame western powers and 
institutions for Africa’s dilemmas forgetting that a key element necessary for these 
western interests to be able to achieve their exploitation objective is the substantial 
cooperation of the African people themselves and the inherent characteristic of most 
African leaders to pursue private interests to the detriment of national interests.63 Honest 
competent leadership was the main reason behind the economic miracles of former 
colonies like Malaysia and Singapore. Both countries, which achieved independence 
after several of the African countries, have since blazed enviable economic trail rather 
than brooding about the damage of colonisation. Singapore’s founding leader has 
explicitly stated the strategy for his country’s economic miracle: 
 
Our greatest asset was the trust and confidence of the people… We were 
careful not to squander this newly gained trust by misgovernment and 
corruption. We needed this political strength to maximise what we could 
make of our few assets, a natural world-class harbour cited in a strategic 
location astride on of the busiest sea-lanes of the world… The other 
valuable asset we had was our people: hardworking, thrifty, eager to learn. 
Although divided into several races, we believed a fair and even handed 
policy would get them to live peacefully together, especially if such 
hardships as unemployment were shared equally and not carried mainly by 
the minority groups… Singapore had no natural resources for MNCs to 
exploit. All it had were hardworking people, good basic infrastructure and a 
government that was determined to be honest and competent. Our duty was 
to create a livelihood for 2 million Singaporeans. If MNCs could give our 
workers employment and teach them technical skills and management know 
how, we should bring in the MNCs.64    
 
Although there is a genuine case for Africans to seek reparations, this can certainly not 
be the solution to the African problem. Even if reparations were to be paid to Africans 
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64 Quoted in Nyong’o (2002, p.4).  
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today, there is no guarantee that it will in any way help the economic and social 
upliftment of the continent. This is because there is clearly no structure of efficiency 
and accountability in place to ensure the effective utilisation of resources in several of 
these African countries. Rather than focus on the limitations of the international 
economic system, which African countries are in no position to impact on, the time has 
come for all to focus on the limitations of Africa’s internal systems which has been the 
major cause of its economic woes and which African countries are in a position to 
influence. The near absence of efficient internal structures has been the main reason 
why most African countries cannot benefit from any international system even when it 
is specifically designed to encourage its profitable participation.  Most African 
countries, for instance, failed to benefit from their preferential trade agreements under 
the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) – European Economic Community (EEC) 
Convention. Despite all incentives, Africa’s economic dealings with the West continued 
to decline. It has for instance been asserted that:  
 
Even under the Lome Conventions and the Cotonou Agreements, ACP-EU 
partnerships presupposed equity in trade relations, improvements in good 
governance in Africa and development payoff for the people. In the 25 years 
between the signature of Lome I in 1975 and the expiry of Lome IV  in 
1990, the share of ACP exports in European markets fell by half, from 
nearly 8 percent to about 3 percent. The main beneficiaries were other 
developing countries such a [those in] South East Asia, which enjoy a level 
of preferential access to the EU (the Generalised System of Preferences) 
that is less favourable than under Lome.65    
 
Although neo liberalism may have limitations, the fact remains that such limitations are 
not geography or colour specific. If, for instance, Singapore and Malaysia are perceived 
to be politically and socially unstable, and corruption prone, the reactions of the 
international economic systems to these countries will be no different than that being 
witnessed in the African arena with similar characteristics. The insinuation of an 
international conspiracy against African is therefore nothing more than illusion that 
needs to be jettisoned. This is the very essence of NEPAD. If NEPAD succeeds, it will 
not be because of the rhetoric of corrupt and inept African leaders on the subject of 
development. Rather it will be because an entrepreneurial group in Africa: South 
African businesses see NEPAD as a channel for expanding their markets in high profit 
and less competitive African countries. By so doing, they are creating jobs, training 
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indigenous labour and establishing basic infrastructure in recipient African countries.  
These are all key ingredients in the development process.   
 
African Development: the Role of South Africa 
 
In Africa, the place of South Africa is unique. It is by far the most developed country in 
the continent.  Despite its credentials, it remains a land extensively divided and where 
the income difference between the poor and rich is very wide. It is, for instance, 
estimated that 51 percent of the annual income in South Africa goes to the richest 10 
percent of the households while less than 4 percent of the annual income goes to the 
poorest 40 percent of households.66 Despite this, the South African Government is bent 
on focusing long term by allowing market forces to drive economic activity, rather than 
attempting to intervene in the economy.  
 
The extensive divide between the rich and the poor in South Africa has its origins in the 
apartheid structure. Although the apartheid policy succeeded in making South Africa a 
pariah state, its minorities continued to thrive economically. When the end of the 
apartheid regime became imminent in the early 1990s, the economic future of the 
country became very uncertain. There were fears that the emergent black government 
may try to redress the past economic and social injustices of the apartheid regime. This 
however would have entailed the nationalisation of the economic interests of the 
apartheid system beneficiaries and increasing public sector control of economic 
activities. This however did not happen. From the very onset, the African National 
Congress adopted a non-racial policy. After assuming Office, President Mandela 
championed the national reconciliation process. This led to accusations that he was 
bending over backwards to placate whites. Mandela refused to relent arguing that 
national renewal could only begin with forgiveness and reconciliation. Any attempt to 
revenge the misdemeanours of the apartheid regime, he argued, could only further 
exasperate the conflict and bloodshed by driving the whites into the arms of the 
rightwing.67 
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The new black leadership of South Africa therefore refused to materially alter the neo 
liberal economic base of the South African Apartheid Regime. Rather it recognised that 
it had a pivotal role to play in engendering the economic development of the African 
continent.68 Thus when Thabo Mbeki, then Vice President, started his crusade for an 
African Renaissance, South African businesses, which saw this as a clear opportunity to 
get government support for their expansionist ambitions, willingly became partners. 
These businesses, therefore worked closely with the government renaissance team to 
develop the economic aspects of the renaissance programme. Along these lines, it has 
been asserted that: 
 
It is a generally accepted view that South Africa cannot achieve optimal 
growth without the growth of the SADC region and the rest of the African 
continent.  Taking note of business requirements should be made an integral 
part of NEPAD’s objectives, both at the level of macro-economic 
management and a favourable investment regime.  It is against this 
background that South African businesses have found it imperative to be 
part of NEPAD.  The idea of Africa’s development gained momentum in 
the 1990s when the role of business in the African Renaissance, the 
forerunner to NEPAD, was articulated in BMF business forums. The 
message from these forums was that business activity can generate the 
required growth for job creation, infrastructure development and poverty 
reduction.  This in turn will provide the necessary tax revenue required for 
an efficient and effective government.69 
 
From the above, it can be argued that South African economic interest was at the heart 
of the development of the African Renaissance70 that later metamorphosed into 
NEPAD.71 The growing South African investments which is being facilitated by 
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70 Not everybody is in agreement with this position. See for instance, Vale and Maseko (1998) for an 
analysis of other motives underpinning the African Renaissance.     
71 It has, for instance, been argued that: “As much as South Africa wants to contribute to peace on the 
continent and create an environment in which all states achieve their full potential, one cannot help but 
think that South Africa's top priorities in the whole affair are its business interests and profits and making 
sure an environment that is conducive to business trade is fully implemented. After all, South African 
businesses are running the national railroad in Cameroon, the national electricity company in Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Cameroon. They are also managing power plants in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mali; building 
roads and bridges in Malawi and Mozambique, and a gas pipeline between offshore Mozambique and 
South Africa. South African Businesses control banks, breweries, supermarkets and hotels throughout the 
continent and provide TV programming to over half of all Africa's states” (Majavu, 2004, p.2).   
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NEPAD is however welcome by several African states. For many of these African 
countries, South Africa now remains their best chance for Foreign Direct Investment. 
As already mentioned, such investments create jobs, train indigenous labour and 
contribute to government coffers via taxes and licence fees. Aside from the above, 
South African business investments, especially in infrastructure has also helped improve 
the business environment in several of he recipient African countries. The investments 
of South African companies, especially MTN and Vodacom have immensely improved 
the telecommunication system in the continent. Vodacom currently has operations in 
Lesotho, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Mozambique. As for 
MTN, it now has operations in Uganda, Rwanda, Swaziland, Cameroon and Nigeria. 
The dearth of telecommunications facilities in the African continent is perhaps best 
illustrated by the fact that the number of MTN subscribers in Nigeria rose rapidly from 
327,000 in 2001 to more that one million in 2003.72 By extending telecommunications 
to users who previously did not have access, these South African telecommunication 
companies have no doubt positively impacted on the general business and economic 
terrain in recipient countries. Another important sector where South African businesses 
have made positive impact in the continent is transport. The advancements in this area 
has been well summarised thus: 
 
Expansion in the transport sector has been fairly dominated by rail 
specialists Spoornet (a division of Transnet Limited) and Comazar 
(subsidiary of Transnet). Spoornet holds country contracts in more than 15 
African countries. Its main responsibilities include upgrading operating and 
in some instances, managing railways…. Comazar, on the other hand has 
only two country contracts. One for a twenty-five year concession to 
manage and operate the national railways of Cameroon and the other to 
establish a trans-shipment facility in Tanzania. Unitrans is another South 
African company involved in enhancing transport distribution and logistics 
in nine Southern African countries namely, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho.  The 
transport sector has been of considerable importance to the region especially 
considering that most countries in Africa are landlocked and depend on 
effective and efficient transport means for distribution of goods to specified 
destinations.73   
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South African businesses therefore appear to be thriving in important development 
sectors where western capital either failed or was too scared to venture into given the 
risk profile of the African continent.  
 
Despite the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes in several African states, 
FDI, especially from the West in these countries have been on the decline. This perhaps 
started with the various nationalization programmes of several African Governments in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The euphoria of independence, sometimes supported by the 
discovery of valuable minerals, propelled some African Governments to demand an end 
to the foreign domination of their economies. This culminated in the indigenization of 
various foreign interests in the affected countries. This had negative consequences for 
the various African economies. Subsequently the poor economic performance of most 
of the countries in the continent forced them to subject themselves to IMF induced 
structural adjustment programmes. This provided for liberalization and opening up of 
market access. Despite this, Foreign Direct Investments have been reluctant to return to 
the continent. The end of the Cold War and the opening up of Eastern European markets 
has also not helped matters. These markets have essentially provided an alternative 
avenue for investing surplus western capital. The situation has been further aggravated 
by the increasing profile of the African continent as a conflict prone region, which 
offers poor security of lives and property for foreign investors. Given the fact that South 
African businesses were used to doing business in apartheid induced high-risk home 
environment, they had little problems coping with the business risks in other African 
states. It was thus not surprising that shortly after the effective end of its international 
isolation in 1991, South Africa overtook the United States of America as the largest 
provider of FDI in Africa.74   
Before 1990, for instance, South African businesses had only 179 business investments 
in 14 African countries. With the effective end of the international isolation of South 
Africa, its business investments in the African continent expanded appreciably. By early 
2004, for instance, the number of South African business investments in the continent 
had risen to 439, spread across 35 countries.75 Given the above trend of South African 
business investments in the rest of Africa, it is not surprising that South Africa is 
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championing the NEPAD project which, apart from making it easier for South African 
companies to access these African markets, will also offer some form of protection, 
especially from nationalization and anti-market policies, for these South African 
investments.76  
The South African State has also explicitly supported the advancement of South African 
capital to the rest of Africa through its own domestic policies. Along these lines, it has 
been asserted that: 
 
South Africa today has emerged as the largest foreign direct investor in the 
continent outstripping both European and American investors. South Africa 
has invested an average of $1.4 billion in annual foreign direct investment 
since 1991….  A recent adjustment to the foreign exchange policy allows 
South African companies to invest up to R2 billion per project in Africa 
(versus R 500 million per project in other global markets) with capital 
raised in South Africa. This is in response to what some political and 
economic commentators see as the government’s alignment to NEPAD, 
which they argue is intended to consolidate the promotion of investment by 
South African corporates into the rest of Africa. The attractiveness of 
investing in Africa has also been underpinned by the favourable returns that 
some South African businesses have registered of over 30%, and in some 
cases 50%-60%, compared to the 16%-20% rate of return in the South 
African market.77 
 
The interest of South Africa in Africa is evidence both of the profitable business 
opportunities existing therein and the country’s determination to play a pivotal role in 
the development of the African continent. It is also such interests that have made the 
South African Government to be reluctant to loose control over the NEPAD Project.78 
Till date, the Headquarters of NEPAD remain in South Africa. It is also no coincidence 
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that Professor Nkuhlu, who is President Mbeki’s economic adviser, heads the NEPAD 
Steering Committee.79  
For the South African business expansion in Africa to be sustainable, however, the 
South African Government has to do more to ensure that South African businesses 
adopt good corporate governance and ethical standards in their business operations in 
the African continent. This is very important giving the rising distrust of these South 
African multinationals in Africa already.80 Some South African businesses are also 
known to be involved in illegal economic activities on the continent. In an October 2002 
Report to the United Nations Security Council on illegal exploitation of natural 
resources in the war thorn Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), 12 South African 
companies were listed as being involved in unethical business practices.81 In Nigeria, 
MTN is mired in controversy for defrauding subscribers.82 At another level, South 
Africa, in its position as Africa’s largest and most sophisticated economy should be 
willing to assume greater role in aiding and financing development in less privileged 
African countries. These will, no doubt, greatly enhance both the acceptability of 
NEPAD and the status of South Africa as a pivotal state in the Continent.  
Conclusion  
In Africa, South Africa stands out as an example of a country where market forces and 
neo liberal economic policies have culminated in private sector led positive economic 
development and growth. It is on the basis of the country’s relative economic strength 
that it has earned the status of a pivotal state in the region. The expectation is that 
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are not produced in South Africa. Countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and many others have resources that are of economic interest to South Africa. There is also the 
issue of political stability. South Africa needs neighbours that are both politically stable and economically 
prosperous. This will not only ensure better markets for South African exports, but also discourage 
excessive migrations of the citizens of other African countries to South Africa. Supporting and sponsoring 
NEPAD, places South Africa in a strong position to become the preferred development partner by a large 
number of African countries” (Nkhulu, 2003, p.3).  
 
80 For instance, a Kenyan legislator recently noted that: “if we continue doing this, we will end up owning 
nothing in Kenya…. They bulldoze their way around. It seems like they have the old attitude of the old 
South Africa” (Quoted in Daniel et al, 2004, p.347). 
 
81 United Nations, 2002, Annex III.  
 
82 See Naidu, 2003, p.19.  
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through the spearhead of NEPAD, the country would be able to engender the economic 
development of its less fortunate neighbours. In return, the South African domestic 
economy will be grown to become more relevant and competitive in the global world. 
The road to African economic renaissance and the sustenance of the NEPAD 
programme is however fraught with risks. While the NEPAD document explicitly spells 
out its expectations from African states especially the need for the adoption of free 
market policies and good governance, it documents little about its expectations from 
owners of foreign capital especially with respect to corporate governance. Given the 
sharp practices by some of these South African investors penetrating all corners of the 
continent under the cover of NEPAD, there is need for the enshrinement of corporate 
governance rules to guide these investments. This will be helpful if the rising 
resentment of such foreign investments is to be stemmed. Finally, there is need for 
South Africa to be more involved in providing developmental assistance to less 
privileged African states. This will, no doubt, help reduce the mistrust for the country, 
which dates back to the apartheid era and increase its acceptability as the continent’s 
pivotal state.   
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Table 1 
  SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE BY MAJOR CONTINENTS    
 EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE (RAND'000)   
YEAR TRADE TOTAL AFRICA TOTAL AMERICAS TOTAL ASIA TOTAL EUROPE 
            
  EXPORT             39,000,060                      34,161,186                65,176,197                   92,019,620 
2003 IMPORT 8217357                      36,436,446                89,131,389                 116,597,093 
  TRADE BALANCE           30,782,703                     (2,275,260)            (23,955,192)              (24,577,473) 
            
  EXPORT             44,580,615                      42,936,076                67,412,717                 105,699,737 
2002 IMPORT               9,937,967                      43,536,528                88,109,497                 123,902,091 
  TRADE BALANCE           34,642,648                        (600,452)            (20,696,780)              (18,202,354) 
            
  EXPORT             34,709,006                      37,331,702                53,268,078                   85,592,016 
2001 IMPORT               5,630,636                      33,833,308                73,479,206                   94,725,235 
  TRADE BALANCE           29,078,370                      3,498,394             (20,211,128)                 (9,133,219) 
            
  RANKING BY         
  TRADE BALANCE:         
  2003 1 2 3 4 
  2002 1 2 4 3 
  2001 1 2 4 3 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa (2004)   
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Table 2 
SOME LARGE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA BY SOUTH AFRICAN   COMPANIES MADE 
BETWEEN 1998 AND 2003 
YEAR TARGET 
(ACQUIRED) 
COMPANY 
HOST 
COUNTRY 
SOURCE 
(ACQUIRING) 
COMPANY 
TRANSAC-
TION VALUE 
($’MILLION) 
INDUSTRY 
      
1998 MTN Nigeria Nigeria MTN 285 Non-Cyclical 
Services 
 
 
2000 
Vodacom 
Tanzania 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
Vodacom 142 Non-Cyclical 
Services 
 Ashanti Goldfield 
Geita Project 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
AngloGold 83 Natural Resources 
 
2001 
 
Paide & Temane 
Gas Fields 
Mozambique Sasol Oil 581 Natural Resources 
 Skorpion Zinc 
Project 
Namibia AngloGold 454 Natural Resources 
 Mozal  II Mozambique Industrial 
Development 
Corporation 
160 Basic Industry 
 Vodacom Congo Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Vodacom 94 Non-Cyclical 
Services 
 
 
Grand Inga Falls 
Hydroelectric 
Project 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Eskom Holdings 1,200 Utilities 
2002 Vodacom Mozambique Vodacom 260 Non-Cyclical 
Services 
 Kamoto Copper 
Mine 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Kumba Resources 120 Basic Industries 
 Caminhos de 
Ferro de 
Mocanbique 
Mozambique Ressano Garcia 
Railway 
Company 
78 Cyclical Services 
 Ashanti Ghana AglGold 454 Natural Resources 
 Zimbabwe 
Platinum Mines 
Zimbabwe Impala Platinum 85 Natural Resources 
 Hartley Platinum 
Mines 
Zimbabwe Impala Platinum 80 Natural Resources 
 Business & 
Tourism Complex 
Angola Sun International 
SA 
60 Cyclical Services 
2003 Kolwezi Tailings 
Project 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Industrial 
Development 
Corporation 
33 Basic Industries 
 Commercial Bank 
of Namibia 
Namibia Nedbank 33 Financial Services 
 Banco Standard 
Totta de 
Mozambique 
Mozambique Stanbic Africa 22 Financial Services 
 Investec Bank 
(Botswana) 
Botswana Stanbic Africa 21 Financial Services 
 Zimbabwe 
Platinum Mines 
Zimbabwe Impala Platinum 19 Natural Resources 
 Escravos Gas to 
Liquid Plant 
Nigeria Sasol  Natural Resources 
Sources: UNCTAD, 2004. 
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TABLE 3 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESS INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA (DATES & NUMBERS) 
Country Pre-1990 1991-2000 2001-2004 Total % of Investment 
          Post-2000 
            
Algeria     2 2 100 
Burkina Faso     1 1 100 
Burundi     1 1 100 
Equatorial Guinea     2 2 100 
Gabon     2 2 100 
Guinea     1 1 100 
Mauritania     1 1 100 
Morocco     1 1 100 
Sao Tome & Principe     1 1 100 
Senegal     3 3 100 
DR Congo   3 7 10 70 
Rwanda   1 2 3 67 
Madagascar   2 3 5 60 
Angola   5 7 12 58 
Nigeria 1 4 7 12 58 
Uganda   5 6 11 55 
Mali 1 2 3 6 50 
Mauritius 1 6 9 13 46 
Tanzania 2 11 11 24 46 
Kenya 3 6 7 16 44 
Ghana   9 6 15 40 
Mozambique 7 11 9 27 33 
Zambia 11 13 5 29 17 
Malawi 7 8 3 18 17 
Botswana 40 8 7 55 13 
Namibia 41 16 6 63 10 
Zimbabwe 24 14 4 42 10 
Lesotho 17 7 1 25 4 
Swaziland 23 6 1 30 3 
Cameroon   1   1  - 
Congo (Brazzaville)   1   1  - 
Eqypt   3   3  - 
Ethiopia   1   1  - 
Ivory Coast 1     1  - 
Seychelles   1   1  - 
Total 179 144 166 439 26 
Source: South Africa Foundation, 2004      
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